I’ve been floating a template law (called “Sustainable Opportunities for Rural Afghans Act”) for over a year now.  I’ve sent copies to my representatives in Congress, to the President, and to various NGO and para-governmental acquaintances.  I expected silence from the chief executive, a form letter from my representative (Hello, Joe Barton), and a bit of bubble (if not action) from my think tank type peeps; but action has been nil and talk has been quiet.  I know I’m no kinda “big deal” on Capital Hill, but what I don’t know is whether or not my proposal is taken by these high-rollers as a bad idea or as just a dot of signal in fields of noise.

Before discussing further, here’s the text of the the thing:

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Title: Sustainable Opportunities for Rural Afghans Act of 2010
An Act To Cripple the Taliban and Help Afghan Farm Families

PREAMBLE: Whereas we now face a global shortage of opiates for the production of morphine and other important medicines, and whereas the Taliban in Afghanistan use the illegal trade in Afghan opium to finance terrorism, and whereas the production of opium in Turkey and other countries is clearly not enough for legitimate medical need, and whereas granting rural Afghan farming families an economic ally other than the Taliban is good for the national security of the United States and secures global economic stability.

SECTION 1: Allow American pharmaceutical companies to buy from Afghan opium farmers.

SECTION 2: Levy no tariffs on Afghan-derived morphine or other opiate medications.

SECTION 3: Offer aid to Afghan opium farmers through The Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Department of State Undersecretary for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs, USAID, and/or other bodies as appropriate.

SECTION 4: All Afghan farmers who are demonstrably cooperating with these new efforts by the United States after 1 year shall receive a bonus of $1000 US. This money shall be a reward for their cooperation, and shall deter farmers from cooperating or rejoining with Taliban interests.  Proven cooperation will result in a “bonus” each calendar year of an additional $100 of to be distributed before the holiday of Eid al-Fitr.

SECTION 5: Any farmer found cooperating with the Taliban, or selling opium to the Taliban will lose his bonus for that year and all other aid until he can again demonstrate that he is cooperating with the United States.

SECTION 6: Afghan farmers will be trained in the production of other crops as may be negotiated by the stakeholders and farmers, and farmers will be aided by the organizations outlined above  (SECTION 3) in finding markets for the new crops so that, at such time as the global opium market no longer requires high levels of sustained production from Afghanistan, the farming families will be equipped to supplement their income with the alternative crops without falling back into interdependence with the Taliban.

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Clearly this law would be bad business for major pharma players (of which there are a mighty plentiful lot in Washington), because an increase in opiate supplies drops prices.  And this could potentially be very good for the narcotics black market, because the United States government would be buying up supply that traditionally wended to heroin dealers — driving up prices in already expensive underground economy.

But on the face of it, this law (or something much like it) would help in the stated efforts to “defeat, disrupt, and dismantle” al Qaeda and its allies.  As we press our advantage after the death of bin Laden, it seems reasonable to use every available tool toward our stated goal.

Unless our stated goal is not our actual goal.

Am I missing something?